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Sovereign bond issues as a new financing instrument 
for developing countries and emerging markets 
One of the striking features of expanding globalization in 
the 1990s was, first of all, a huge rise in the volume of 
international capital flows. In the past decade the net 
inflows of private sector debt instruments into emerging 
markets and developing countries was at times two to 
three times as high as the inflows of public sector funds. 
Second, the structure of international capital flows 
went through a process of substantial change in the 1990s. 
Compared with the 1970s and 1980s, when medium term 
bank loans provided by a small number of large interna-
tional banks accounted for the dominant share of capital 
flows to developing countries, international sovereign 
bond issues held by heterogeneous creditor groups grew 
to substantially levels in the 1990s. Prior to the 1997 
Asian crisis, in the years between 1990 and 1996, the net 
inflows of capital provided to developing countries by the 
private sector in the form of bonds grew from US $ 1.2 bn 
to US $ 62.3 bn. 
On the one hand, private sector capital flows for sover-
eign bond issues contribute to broadening the investor 
base and enable investors and debtors alike to enhance 
their risk diversification. On the other hand, a heteroge-
neous creditor structure tends to entail coordination and 
collective action problems, and volatile capital move-
ments may trigger welfare eroding debt and financial 
crises in developing countries. While it is true that the risk 
posed by fluctuating capital movements is greatest for 
short term investments such as bank loans, stocks, or 
currency speculation, bonds with more or less long terms 
are less subject to such fluctuations. But their performance, 
which depends crucially on economic development, may 
vary substantially, especially in secondary markets. This 
makes it more difficult for bond issuers to secure re-  
 
financing in the international financial markets. This 
problem is illustrated by Table 1. Net flows of capital (in 
the form of bonds) to developing countries declined con-
siderably in the summer of 1997, following the Asian 
crisis. 
Problems encountered in restructuring sovereign bond 
issues 
The size and heterogeneous make up of the creditor 
groups involved in sovereign bond issues is inevitably 
bound up with coordination problems when it comes to 
a restructuring of such bond issues. Collective action 
problems present an additional difficulty in the restruc-
turing of sovereign bond issues, one that may place obsta-
cles in the way of an orderly and relatively inexpensive 
restructuring process. 
• The holdout problem: A restructuring process fa-
vorable for a majority of creditors can be blocked by 
a creditor minority (holdouts). If creditors see a 
chance to enforce their claims in full following con-
clusion of a restructuring process likely to entail 
losses for them, they will have an incentive to refuse 
to participate in it.  
• The rush to the exit problem: If creditors see any 
reason to fear that their debtor may be threatened 
with a debt crisis, they are likely to seek to sell their 
claims as soon as they possibly can. It is rational for 
the individual creditor to seek to be the first to sell his 
claims, the reason being that in the case of a liquidity 
squeeze on the debtor side the first creditors to sell 
their bonds are likely to secure a better price than the 
others. 
• The rush to the courthouse problem: The risk in-
volved here is that creditors may take legal action to 
secure their claims. 
 
 
 
• The frequency with which international financial crises have occurred since the mid-1990s (Asia 1997, Russia 
1998, Brazil 1999, and Argentina 2001) points to the need to reform the international financial architecture. The 
emergence of and the unregulated approaches used to resolve financial crises lead to major welfare losses in the 
countries affected and constitute a risk to the stability of the international financial system. 
• Instruments tailored to restructuring sovereign foreign debt therefore constitute an essential element of the inter-
national financial architecture. However, these mechanisms have not been developed in keeping with the far-
reaching upheavals which globalization have entailed for the international financial markets. 
• One important feature of the expansion of globalization in the 1990s was a huge rise in and an altered structure of 
international capital flows. Sovereign bond issues held by heterogeneous groups of creditors assumed an entirely 
new significance in the 1990s compared to bank credits, which dominated in the 1970s and 1980s. 
• In the case that a sovereign state is forced to default on a bond issue, the heterogeneous makeup of the creditor 
structure gives rise to serious problems involving coordination and collective action that cannot be resolved with-
out recourse to new instruments. Under current circumstances a restructuring of bonds takes several years, as can 
be clearly seen in the case of Argentina. 
• In view of the fact that at present most actors in the international financial markets reject an international insol-
vency procedure, both a voluntary code of conduct and collective action clauses constitute, in the short term, the 
most important instruments for restructuring sovereign bond issues. In the medium term, though, an insolvency 
procedure can play an important role here, since a procedure of this kind is a comprehensive instrument well sui-
ted to coordinating different creditor groups prior to and during a debt crisis. 
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Approaches for restructuring sovereign bond issues 
1 Voluntary approach: a code of conduct 
The proposed code of conduct published by the Banque 
de France (the so called Trichet proposal) is the best such 
proposal advanced thus far. It covers the conduct of all 
market actors – creditors, debtors, and the public sector – 
prior to and during a debt crisis; the provisions of the 
proposed code include e.g. a timely dialogue between 
creditors and debtors, a fair exchange of information 
among all parties involved, speedy and cooperative nego-
tiations, equal treatment of all creditors, and continued 
adherence to the terms of existing contracts. 
While a code of conduct can contribute to resolving col-
lective action problems, it is not suited to fully eliminat-
ing them. A code of conduct can neither prevent a rush to 
the exit nor provide any formal protection against creditor 
litigation, nor does a code offer any safeguards against 
holdout behaviors. 
However, a well crafted code of conduct can contribute to 
coming up with a procedural mechanism that sets out how 
debtors and creditors ought to coordinate a restructuring 
procedure with a view to rendering the affected state's 
debt sustainable. The principles set out in a code of con-
duct can contribute to resolving the following coordina-
tion problems: 
• Coordinating the restructuring of a single bond 
issue: The aim here is to prevent a creditor minority 
from opting out of a restructuring measure decided 
upon by a majority of creditors.  
 
 
• Coordinating the restructuring of different bond 
issues 
• Coordinating the restructuring of different classes 
of debt (bonds and loans): One possible coordina-
tion mechanism is application of the principle of 
equal treatment, which was adopted by the Paris Club 
for public sector loans. 
• Coordinating a restructuring process with a debtor 
country's economic policy: A code of conduct can 
set out principles of conduct that provide for coordi-
nation of a restructuring process with changes in a 
debtor country's economic policy. 
• Coordinating creditors in their attempts to come up 
with a decision on possible approaches to solving the 
problem at hand. 
If a code of conduct is to prove effective, it is of the ut-
most importance that it will be accepted by the interna-
tional community and that the parties involved develop a 
sense of ownership. All parties concerned – creditors, 
debtors, and the public sector – should therefore be in-
volved in the implementation of a code of conduct. A 
code of conduct being voluntary in nature, it is necessary 
to create incentives to induce actors in the international 
financial markets to abide by such a code. 
The role of the public sector: The public sector, includ-
ing the IMF or the Paris Club, should assume an active 
role in applying a code of conduct. Even though, theoreti-
cally, restructuring negotiations could be proceed without 
any public sector involvement, this would run counter to  
 
 
 
• The frequency with which international financial crises have occurred since the mid-1990s (Asia 1997, Russia 
1998, Brazil 1999, and Argentina 2001) points to the need to reform the international financial architecture. The 
emergence of and the unregulated approaches used to resolve financial crises lead to major welfare losses in the 
countries affected and constitute a risk to the stability of the international financial system. 
The example of Argentina 
Argentina is a prime example of a state with a high foreign debt held by a large and heterogeneous group of creditors. 
At the end of 2001 Argentina suspended the service of a large share of its debt to private sector creditors. In 2003 the 
Argentine government made the private sector holders of its bonds a restructuring proposal under which these bond-
holders would have received only about one quarter of the value of their bonds. In 2002 Argentina's foreign debt was 
four time as high as its annual export earnings. The short term share of its foreign debt was likewise very high: ex-
pressed as a percentage of its currency reserves, the figure was 143 % in 2002. The structure of Argentina's foreign debt 
is a good example of the important role played by sovereign bond issues. In 2001 the public sector accounted for 
roughly two thirds of Argentina's foreign debt. Sovereign bonds in turn accounted for over 50 % of this debt. Aside 
from public sector and large private sector creditors such as banks, Argentina's creditors consisted of some 600.000 
private sector bondholders, a fact which gave rise to considerable coordination and collective action problems. Another 
factor unfavorable to a restructuring process was that the bonds involved – a total of more than 150 different issues – 
were floated in eight different jurisdictions. This example clearly indicates that a restructuring procedure even for one 
class of debt bonds may entail substantial coordination problems. At the end of 2003 an agreement between bondhold-
ers and the Argentinian Government was not reached and not yet in sight. Probably, Argentina has lost the access to 
international financial markets. 
Table 1: Structure of net long terma capital flows to developing countries, 1980–2001, in billions of US $ 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001b
Total 82.5 73.4 98.5 260.2 306.6 341.4 336.7 271.8 261.1 196.5
Public Flows 32.6 40.7 55.9 54.1 30.3 40.7 53.4 47.4 35.3 36.5
Private Flows 41.1 21.8 42.6 206.1 276.2 300.7 283.3 224.4 225.8 160.0
Private Debt Instruments       – 21.8 15.7 63.3 96.5 98.1 89.4 5.6 8.2 -26.8
    Thereof: Bondsc 1.1 6.0 1.2 30.7 62.3 49.6 40.9 29.5 16.9 9.5
    Bank Credits 30.8 8.5 3.2 30.9 32.2 45.6 51.9 -23.3 -6.1 -32.3
 Other Debt Instruments 9.2 7.5 11.4 1.7 2.1 2.9 -3.4 -0.5 -2.5 -4.0
Foreign Direct Investment 9.1 11.8 24.5 106.8 130.8 172.5 178.3 184.4 166.7 168.2
a Long term m ans that capital flows have a m turity of more than 1 year. 
b Data for 2001 are prelimi ary. 
c D tailed informatio  about the type of bonds d  not exist, but these are probably mostly sov reign bond. 
Source: World Bank (1990), (1999) and (2002) 
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practical experience, and thus far debt restructuring has as 
a rule been linked with an IMF program worked out prior 
to a final agreement between debtor and creditors. 
• The IMF could promote a code's implementation by 
making explicit reference to the code of conduct in its 
programs and its lending into arrears policy.  
• The Paris Club could urge debtors to implement the 
code when the latter call for equal treatment by all 
creditors in connection with debt restructuring talks 
conducted in the framework of the Paris Club.  
The role of debtors: The emerging markets should signal 
their willingness to adopt a code of conduct, e.g. by in-
cluding the code's principles in the documents for their 
sovereign bond issues. It might be advisable to publish a 
list of countries that have adopted the code, perhaps on 
the model of the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Stan-
dards (SDDSs), which define the transparency obligations 
of member countries. 
2 Contractual approach: collective action clauses 
Introduction of collective action clauses serves to simplify 
the restructuring of sovereign bond issues. There are four 
different types of collective action clauses: 
• Majority clauses: Based on majority clauses, a quali-
fied majority of creditors can modify the terms of 
bond issues and thus force through a restructuring 
procedure. 
• Sharing clauses require creditors who receive pay-
ments during a restructuring process to share them 
with other bondholders on a proportional basis. 
• Aggregation provisions serve to aggregate bond 
issues and other debt instruments (loans) for creditor 
decision processes. 
• Collective representation clauses are designed to 
accelerate the convocation of a representative forum 
at which both creditor and debtor positions are aired. 
Most actors in the international financial markets see col-
lective action clauses as an instrument suited to both pre-
venting and resolving debt crises. Still, only a limited num-
ber of countries include collective action clauses in their 
bond issues. As a rule, collective action clauses are in-
cluded in bond issues floated under UK and Luxembourg 
law. Bond issues floated under US, German, and Japanese 
law, on the other hand, do not include collective action 
clauses. At the end of 2001 some 75 % of outstanding 
international bond issues were without collective action 
clauses (Table 2). In 2003, though, some important emerg-
ing markets – Mexico and Brazil – floated bond issues 
amounting to US $ 1 bn each and containing collective 
action clauses. Despite the clauses the demand for these 
bonds was high – and both issues were oversubscribed. 
Over the short to medium term collective action clauses 
constitute an important instrument for restructuring sover-
eign bond issues in emerging markets. By requiring the 
participation of minorities in decisions taken by a quali-
fied majority on amendments of bond contracts, collective 
action clauses alleviate coordination problems that occur 
in restructuring a bond issue. They furthermore serve to 
ease three problems of collective action that may occur 
with one bond issue: 
• The holdout problem: Majority clauses make it 
more difficult for individual creditors not to partici-
pate in a restructuring process, seeking instead to 
wait until the debtor is in a better financial situation 
in order then to enforce 100 % of their claims. 
• The rush to the courthouse problem: Collective action 
clauses make it more difficult for individual creditors to 
take recourse to litigation to enforce their claims. 
• The rush to the exit problem: Collective action 
clauses such as e.g. sharing clauses can serve to pre-
vent creditors from selling their bonds as soon as they 
see a risk of a financial crisis. 
Collective action clauses are, however, bound up with, 
basically, two disadvantages. First, collective action 
clauses are not a comprehensive instrument for the re-
structuring of sovereign foreign debt since they rule out 
any aggregation of different debt instruments (loans and 
bond issues). For this reason collective action clauses 
continue to be faced with holdout problems and problems 
with litigation between different debt instruments when 
different bondholder groups decide in favor of different 
solutions. 
Second, it will prove difficult to convert old bond issues 
without collective action clauses into new issues with 
such clauses. For this reason only new bond issues should 
contain collective action clauses – even though this would 
of course mean that the entire stock of old bond issues 
would be without collective action clauses. An IMF study 
published in June 2002 found that it would be roughly ten 
years before some three quarters of all sovereign bond 
issue floated in the international financial markets con-
tained collective action clauses. This implies a transition 
problem that hinges on the volume of new issues, the 
terms of outstanding issues, and the willingness of issuers 
to include collective action clauses in their contracts. It is 
therefore important to set incentives for issuers to include 
collective action clauses in their bond contracts. 
In the framework of its monitoring policy the IMF, for in-
stance, could seek to induce countries to make use of collec-
tive action clauses. In connection with its regular Article IV 
consultations the IMF could check to see whether the coun-
tries concerned have included collective action clauses in 
their contracts on new bond issues. The IMF could then 
prepare a publicly accessible list of bond issues containing 
collective action clauses. Furthermore, the IMF/World Bank 
Guidelines on Public Debt Management could be enlarged to 
include collective action clauses for bond contracts. 
The G10 countries should, for the following reasons, pro-
vide their international bond issues with collective action 
clauses: 
• First, inclusion of collective action clauses in sover-
eign bond issues of industrialized countries would 
provide a signal indicating that the practice is not a 
sign of poor creditworthiness. 
• Second, collective action clauses would in this case 
no longer constitute an exceptional phenomenon in 
the legal systems of some countries. 
Table 2: Stock of outstanding bonds by jurisdiction  
(End 2001) 
Jurisdiction in % of 
total 
Number in 
Mn. US $ 
Number of 
bonds 
(excluding 
Bradies for 
USA) 
Great Britain 
Germany 
Japan 
USA 
Others 
  24.1 
  10.1 
   5.9 
  59.1 
    0.8 
  85,182 
  35,864 
  20,716 
209,199 
    3,168 
156 
  89 
  59 
233 
  21 
Total 100.0 354,129 558 
Source: IMF (2002) 
 • Third, market actors would in this way become ac-
customed to the inclusion of collective action clauses 
in international bond issues. 
3 Comprehensive approach: the IMF proposal on an 
international insolvency procedure 
The IMF has advanced a detailed proposal on establishing 
an insolvency procedure which would provide a legal 
framework for dealing with overindebted countries and 
make it possible for these countries to engage in an or-
derly debt restructuring process. There are four good 
arguments in favor of an insolvency procedure: 
• First, an insolvency procedure would largely provide 
the means needed to solve the three collective action 
problems – rush to the exit, rush to the courthouse, 
and the holdout problem. 
• Second, an insolvency procedure would set incen-
tives for a timely restructuring because, compared 
with the status quo, the procedure provides for an or-
derly and predictable course of the restructuring pro-
cess. This would make it possible to reduce the high 
costs which result from delays in initiating restruc-
turing processes. 
• Third, compared with collective action clauses, the 
proposed procedure is a comprehensive approach that 
can be used to restructure different types of debt 
(bonds and loans) at the same time. 
• Fourth, the proposed procedure would make it possi-
ble to involve private sector creditors in the resolu-
tion of debt crises. 
Many actors in the international financial markets reject 
an international insolvency. Most developing countries 
and emerging markets do not support the proposal for 
the following reasons: 
• First, developing countries could lose access to the 
international capital markets once such a procedure 
had been initiated. But since access hinges on a coun-
try's overall economic development, a debtor country 
would have a chance to improve its reputation 
following an insolvency procedure by enhancing its 
economic performance, in this way regaining access 
to the international capital markets. 
• Second, the financial support provided by interna-
tional financial institutions in cases of crisis might 
decline in connection with the adoption of an insol-
vency procedure. The IMF does not, however, intend 
to tighten up its criteria for lending to countries that 
have initiated an insolvency procedure. 
Private sector creditors, in particular banks and banking 
associations, generally reject the proposed international 
insolvency procedure for the following reasons: 
• First, the private sector actors in the international 
financial markets, banks in particular, fear that the 
procedure might serve to reinforce debtor moral ha-
zard. Since the procedure would make it easier for 
debtors to open insolvency proceedings, they might 
be tempted to take advantage of the procedure. 
Whether or not a debtor country will be able to derive 
benefits from an insolvency procedure will also de-
pend on the negotiations it conducts with its credi-
tors, who have considerable say in the procedure.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Second, private sector actors are of the opinion that 
the insolvency procedure might even trigger a finan-
cial crisis in debtor countries, since private sector ac-
tors would withdraw their short term capital from 
such countries as soon as an insolvency procedure 
was announced. But it should be noted that a finan-
cial crisis would be triggered only if actors in finan-
cial markets believed that an insolvency procedure 
was going to lead to a suboptimal result. 
• Third, private sector actors criticize the debt catego-
ries marked for inclusion in the IMF's proposed in-
solvency procedure, especially the inclusion of cred-
its provided by multilateral and bilateral international 
organizations. This would tend to lower the accep-
tance of the proposed procedure by other creditors, 
unsettling the markets. 
Even though the proposed international insolvency proce-
dure is at present rejected by most actors in the interna-
tional financial markets, it could prove to be an important 
instrument for restructuring sovereign bond issues, and 
one that could solve the three collective action problems 
outlined above. Moreover, the proposal on an interna-
tional insolvency procedure would be well suited to solv-
ing the problem of aggregating different debt classes, 
credits and bonds and grouping debts within these classes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Kathrin Berensmann 
Economist 
 
Professional staff, 
Department: Globalization: 
Trade, Direct Investment, 
Monetary Policy, Develop-
ment Financing 
Literature for further reading: 
Banque de France (2003): Towards a Code of Good Conduct 
on Sovereign Debt Re-Negotiation. Trichet-Proposal, Paris 
Berensmann, K. (2003): Involving Private Creditors in the 
Prevention and Resolution of International Debt Crises. Ger-
man Development Institute, Reports and Working Papers 
8/2003, Bonn 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2002): Collective Action 
Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts. Encouraging Greater Use, 
Prepared by the Policy Development and Review, International 
Capital Markets and Legal Departments, Washington D.C. 
- (2003): Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism. Prepared by the Legal and Policy Development 
and Review Departments in Consultation with the International 
Capital Markets and Research Departments, Washington D.C. 
 
DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK©
GERMAN DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE · INSTITUT ALLEMAND DE DEVELOPPEMENT
TULPENFELD 4 · D-53113 BONN · TELEFON +49 (0)228 94927-0 · FAX +49 (0)228 94927-130
die@die-gdi.de · www.die-gdi.de · ISSN 1615-5483
